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ABSTRACT 
Love and Taxes – and Matching Institutions 
by Kai A. Konrad and Kjell Erik Lommerud * 
We study a setting with search frictions in the marriage market and with 
incomplete contracting inside the family. Everyone prefers a partner that has 
high income and is a perfect emotional match, but compromises must often be 
struck. A high income earner may abstain from marrying a low-income earner 
even though they would be a perfect match emotionally, because the high-
income earner may dislike the implicit income redistribution implied by the 
marriage. Redistributive income taxation may ease this problem. Income 
matching institutions that secure that people largely from the same income 
groups meet each other can substitute for redistribution, so that optimal 
redistribution is reduced. We also introduce a divorce option. Redistributive 
taxation is shown both to further and stabilize marriage. 
 
Keywords: Marriage, optimal taxation, emotional rents, love, incomplete contracts, 
assortative mating, divorce  
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Love and Taxes – and Matching Institutions 
Wenn Menschen mit unterschiedlichem Einkommen heiraten, führt dies zu einer 
Umverteilung innerhalb der Ehe von der wirtschaftlich stärkeren zur 
wirtschaftlich schwächeren Person. Zwei Personen, die zufällig aufeinander 
treffen und aufgrund ähnlicher Interessen und Neigungen gut zueinander 
passen, werden auch die finanziellen Folgen einer Heirat berücksichtigen. Falls 
die Person mit hohem Einkommen diese Umverteilung als zu stark empfindet, 
kommt die Ehe nicht zustande. Die Rente, die z.B. dadurch entsteht, dass das 
Paar ähnliche Interessen hat oder gemeinsamen Hobbys nachgehen kann, geht 
in diesem Fall verloren. Progressive Besteuerung führt zu einer Angleichung 
der Einkommensverteilung und verringert daher die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass 
Ehen aufgrund hoher Einkommensunterschiede nicht zustande kommen. Aus 
wohlfahrtstheoretischer Sicht ist dies ein positiver Aspekt umverteilender 
Besteuerung, der bisher in der Literatur nicht berücksichtigt wurde. Die optimale 
Höhe der Besteuerung hängt von den "Matching-Institutionen" ab, d.h. davon 
wer wen auf dem Heiratsmarkt trifft. Treffen vorwiegend Personen mit 
unterschiedlichem Einkommen und ähnlichen Interessen aufeinander, ist der 
positive Effekt der Besteuerung besonders wirksam. In diesem Fall ist der 
optimale Steuersatz umso höher, je ähnlicher die Interessen der potentiellen 
Partner ist. Umgekehrt kann progressive Besteuerung in einer Gesellschaft, in 
der vorwiegend Personen mit ohnehin ähnlichem Einkommen aufeinander-
treffen, kaum etwas bewirken. Daher fällt in diesem Fall der optimale Steuersatz 
umso geringer aus, je ähnlicher die Einkommen der potentiellen Paare auf dem 
Heiratsmarkt sind.  
1 Introduction
When King Edward VIII and Wallis Simpson married, this was seen as a
love-marriage. King Edward VIII lost power, status and wealth, but must
have gained along some other dimensions, which probably included emotional
rents. In terms of status or income, the couple was not a perfect match, but
in terms of their preferences and emotions, the match was seemingly excellent.
The gains from marrying and becoming the Duke and the Duchess of Windsor
must have overcompensated Edwards’ material loss. Had Edward’s aﬀection
for Wallis been potentially still large, but smaller than his material loss, he
might have preferred his job as King of Britain. Both had sacrificed the benefits
of what is considered a happy marriage.
We consider the role of income diﬀerences and "match quality" for
marriage decisions in a framework with frictions in the process of assortative
matching and with incomplete marriage contracts. The redistributional con-
sequences of marriage are a potential source of eﬃciency losses in marriage
matching markets. People who would be a good match in terms of their con-
sumption preferences, in terms of emotional attachment, or because they share
some feelings of love and romantic mutual attachment, have to consider the
financial implications of entering into marriage. If the match is very good and
the emotional benefit of being together is suﬃciently high, they may dominate
the negative fiscal implications which one of the spouses may incur.1 Given
everything else constant, diﬀerences in income or productivity, together with
the redistributional implications of marriage, make it less likely that two ran-
domly matched persons will marry.2 3 Redistributive income taxation will be
generically beneficial in this context, even though it creates some distortions
1Empirically, the role of "love" in marriage decisions is the topic of research in other
social science disciplines which studies intercultural diﬀerences in the importance of "love"
for marriage decisions (see, e.g., Levine et al. 1995, and Sprecher et al. 1994)
2Wong (2002), for instance, presents evidence for this. She shows that wage is a desirable
trait in predicting ‘marriageability’. Ermisch, Francesconi and Siedler (2006) surveys some
of the literature that documents the empirical importance of mating assorted along the
dimensions of income and socio-economic status.
3Production of oﬀspring is, of course, another important driver of marriage, as has been
argued convincingly by Edlund (1999, 2006). This particular aspect is disregarded here,
as it is orthogonal to the aspects we consider. Production of oﬀspring cannot, however,
be the only motivation for individuals to marry. There are marriages with female partners
who passed their fertility age, marriages with male partners who voluntarily underwent
sterilization and marriages between homosexual couples. These are diﬃcult to explain on
the basis of a desire to reproduce. We think that the factors that influence marriage decisions
in these cases are also relevant factors for marriage decisions for couples who are planning
to have oﬀspring.
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in the labor market: redistributive taxation equalizes individuals’ incomes as
singles, and therefore reduces the eﬃciency problem of ex ante heterogeneity
of matched partners.
Our main results are on the importance of taxes as a possible means
to improve the matching outcome in marriage markets with diﬀerent types of
matching institutions. Some institutions make it more likely that individuals
with similar incomes are matched. For instance, school tracking selects chil-
dren according to their abilities and their family background, and clubs and
associations with membership fees sort individuals along income or earnings
abilities. We refer to these institutions as income matching. Other institutions
improve the matching by making it more likely that individuals with congruent
or complementary preferences are matched. We refer to these as preference
matching institutions. For instance, when people choose their leisure activi-
ties, they typically cluster along their preferences. Two persons who run into
each other at a Rolling Stones concert are both likely to like rock music, and
people who meet at the Royal Opera House are likely to share some other pref-
erences as regards music.4 We show that the role of redistributive taxation
is limited, if the existing matching institutions in a country provide good in-
come matching. Intuitively, income matching institutions reduce or eliminate
the market failure in matching markets that is caused by income inequality
of matched individuals. However, preference matching institutions increase
the probability that individuals with diﬀerent incomes but with highly similar
preferences meet and decide whether to marry. We show that strong prefer-
ence matching strengthens the role of redistributive taxation as an eﬃciency
enhancing policy tool. Hence, income matching institutions and redistributive
taxation are strategic substitutes, but preference matching institutions and
redistributive taxation are strategic complements.
Fernandez, Guner and Knowles (2005) have a starting point that is
similar to ours. They see marital sorting, as we do, as a compromise between
love and money. Their particular focus is on the regeneration of inequality
in societies with high skill premia. Because inequality is high, the rich will
4In a series of articles, for example 18.11.2007, the Norwegian newspaper VG covered
friendship ties and matching institutions among rich young Norwegians, with an emphasis on
Oslo. They first used friendship lists from Facebook to recontruct a large network of friends
among the young rich. Then they interviewed network members about how friendships were
formed and how matching took place. Choice of sports (alpine skiing and tennis rather than
soccer), choice of high school, high school graduation celebrations, and certain social events,
as the so-called Roccocco ball, where mentioned as meeting places. This also shows that in
an egalitarian society as Norway, where preference matching perhaps is common, there may
still be smaller groups, as the ultra-rich, that see the need for income matching institutions.
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marry the rich, and the poor are left with each other. In turn, this could
imply that some households are cash constrained when it comes to investing
in children’s education. In this way a society can be trapped in an inequality
trap. Our emphasis is on tax policy in a situation in which potential spouses
are willing, to some extent, to sacrifice love for money. Redistributive taxation
tends to make love cheaper, but the precise policy prescription depends on the
matching institutions in a society. The two types of matching institutions
may be of diﬀerent importance in diﬀerent countries or in diﬀerent periods
of history.5 Both types of institution make marriage for given matches gen-
erally more likely (compared to a pure random matching), but the first type
of institution tends to induce marriage between individuals with similar in-
comes, and the second type of institution makes marriage between individuals
with high income diﬀerences more likely. These eﬀects are strengthened if the
redistributional tax is chosen that is optimal given the respective matching in-
stitutions. Seen from the perspective of income groups, the rich prefer income
matching institutions, whereas the poor prefer preference matching institu-
tions. However, redistributive taxation — as mentioned — is most important in
societies with preference matching. Perhaps economic analysis is not the right
tool to predict how marriage matching institutions come about, but we see
the contours of an argument why high-inequality income-matching societies
can coexist with low-inequality preference-matching societies, as both types
of society go some diﬀerent ways towards solving the problems described here
associated with frictions in the household formation process.
In a further step we allow for uncertainty about the quality of a given
match at the point of potential marriage, and for divorce. A divorce option has
interesting properties in matching markets, and one of the counter-intuitive re-
sults on divorce has been highlighted by Chiappori and Weiss (2006) who show
that high divorce rates may improve the performance of the matching markets
for remarriage. As we do not consider remarriage, our analysis is diﬀerent. We
ask what the role of divorce cost for marriage and divorce decisions is, if the
quality of a given match is still uncertain at the point of marriage while the
true quality can be assessed once the marriage has taken place. Marriage has
an option value in this case, but, due to the divorce cost, marriage also has
some lock-in eﬀect. We show that while the stronger partner in a given match
benefits from low divorce cost a positive divorce cost may increase welfare. Our
5As shown in Ermisch, Francesconi and Siedler (2006), for instance, who analyse the
implications of assorted mating for intergenerational income mobility, Germany has a higher
degree of assortative mating along the dimensions of income and socio-economic status than
the UK in the 1990ies. They mention that early educational tracking may be the key driver
of this diﬀerence.
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emphasis is on the interaction between taxation and divorce cost. We show
that taxation makes it less likely that a given couple will be divorced, and may
also increase the likelihood of marriage for given marriage institutions.
To study the mentioned eﬀects we remove many other interesting as-
pects from the analysis. We use a crude matching framework that preserves
and emphasizes the frictions in dynamic matching frameworks: each individ-
ual meets only one possible partner.6 This preserves the characteristics of
frictions that has been studied in matching frameworks if the frequency of
new mating partners showing up is not infinite and also removes some inter-
esting properties of matching markets from the picture that cannot develop in
a one-shot matching market.7 Our framework could be extended to a dynamic
matching market with repeated matches. The static approach is suitable, how-
ever, for considering ex ante heterogeneity plus match specific heterogeneity
and it is rich enough to study the interaction of taxation and the quality and
characteristics of the matching process. If assortative matching is not fric-
tionless, ex ante heterogeneity of matched partners will result in ineﬃciency
as regards the appropriation of the match specific benefits: partners with
high earning ability will refuse matches with partners with low earning abil-
ity even if the match has high match specific benefits. This basic ineﬃciency
and a role of redistributive taxation also emerges in more complex, repeated
matching problems.8 Also, we apply a stylized framework for describing deci-
sions within a marriage. It is important for the subject of our analysis that
marriage leads to some income distribution between the spouses within a mar-
riage, and we pursue a benchmark for which this income redistribution yields
to egalitarian consumption inside the marriage. This egalitarian outcome is
for analytical simplicity only. The theory of the family has emphasized that
marriage contracts are genuinely incomplete, and are therefore likely to lead
to redistribution inside the marriage. Because many goods consumed in a
6This implies that the "problem with marriage" will tend to be that people choose to
live alone to avoid suﬀering the redistribution eﬀects of marriage. In a broader model, this
would probably translate to a problem of people settling for marrying others that they love
only a little, and forego marriages with more love but also more redistribution.
7A large literature has emerged that studies the dynamics and equilibrium in search and
matching markets with two-sided search with either ex ante heterogeneity or match specific
heterogeneity (see, e.g., Burdett and Coles 1999).
8Empirically, the implications of taxation for marriage have attracted some attention.
Several studies consider the financial implications that marriage has for a couple’s joint
income, and how these implications aﬀect the decision whether to marry (Feenberg and
Rosen, 1994, Alm andWhittington 1995). Whether, and how, redistributive income taxation
and its income equalizing eﬀect aﬀects the turnover in the marriage market is, so far, an
open question.
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family are non-rival and/or non-exclusive between family members, marriage
between people whose income and productivity skills are not the same will
typically involve redistribution of income within the family. This is true for all
the major economic approaches in the literature that analyse the family. In
Becker’s (1981) version of the family with a benevolent dictator who receives
all family income and allocates it altruistically among the family members,
this fact is the basis of, for instance, Becker’s rotten-kid theorem. In the non-
cooperative family introduced by Lundberg and Pollak (1993) and Konrad and
Lommerud (1995), family members contribute income to a family public good
non-cooperatively. As is well known from the literature on the private pro-
vision of public goods (Bergstrom 1989), such contribution links exert strong
redistributional pressure.9 Finally, also in approaches that describe the family
as an eﬃcient bargaining framework in which the threat point of negotiations is
the non-cooperative equilibrium, the redistribution that emerges in the threat
point outcome spills over to the cooperative bargaining outcome (see, e.g.,
Konrad and Lommerud 2000, Lundberg and Pollak 2003).
We consider the optimal linear income tax in a framework in which the
government does not have any redistributional preferences per se and deter-
mine the optimal linear tax that trades oﬀ the negative incentive eﬀects in the
labor market and the positive eﬀects on the marriage decisions. This reveals a
new beneficial aspect of redistributive income taxation that adds to the bene-
ficial eﬀects that have been found in the context of status preferences (Corneo
2002) or altruism (Hochman and Rodgers 1974), the eﬀect of narrowing income
diﬀerentials on redistributional conflict and crime rates (Pauly 1973), on the
equality of opportunities for future generations and to the standard Mirrlees
(1971) optimal taxation argument for redistributional taxation as a type of
social insurance, i.e., the maximizing of the expected utility of individuals ex
ante, prior to knowing their future place in society. The motive we consider is
also diﬀerent from the motives of optimal taxation of families with or without
household production as in Apps and Rees (1999a, 1999b, 2005), as they con-
sider families that already exist. Schroyen (2003) also considers redistributive
taxation in a setting of existing families, with a focus on arbitrage possibilities
among family members. The benefits of redistributive income taxation occurs
9Families may also establish implicit contracts or explicit income sharing agreements
for purposes of risk sharing, as has been discussed by (Anderberg 2001). Also from the
point of view of individual perceptions, Pahl (1995) shows that, even though there is some
heterogeneity within marriages about how partners perceive their incomes as private or
joint family income, a large share of households simply pool all their income, and almost all
households have some partial income pooling, and this essentially results in income sharing
and equalization within the marriage.
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via its eﬀects for the formation of families: matches with high match specific
utility may not establish a relationship due to intra-family redistribution. Re-
distributive taxation reduces such redistributional concerns and this improves
family formation for given match quality. This beneficial eﬀect of income tax-
ation is also quite diﬀerent from the eﬀects of taxation studied in the context
of existing families which may be characterized by non-cooperative behavior
inside the family. In this literature, it has been shown that taxes may aﬀect
ineﬃciencies from non-cooperation inside the family, as discussed in Konrad
and Lommerud (1995) and in Anderberg and Balestrino (2003). These eﬀects
are absent in the analysis here, as, in order to remove such eﬀects from the
picture, we consider a framework in which all decisions on labor market eﬀort
inside the family are chosen fully eﬃciently, and we do not consider household
production.
The notion that there are tendencies to positive assortative mating in
the formation of households is central for the present analysis. Fernandez,
Gul and Knowler (2005) confim this using data from 34 countries. Other
work that present supportive evidence of positive assortative mating include —
for diﬀerent precise definitions of inequality — Boulier and Rosenzweig (1984),
Lam (1988) and Mare (1991). Aslaksen, Wennemo and Aaberge (2005) asks
how the disequalizing contribution from women’s income and the degree of
assortative mating has evolved in Norway from 1973-1997. They find stronger
evidence for assortative mating in the 1990s than in the 1980s — and in Nor-
way the 1990s were a period where economic inequalities were on the rise in
Norway compared to the decase before. Smith, Ultee and Lammers (1998)
find an invered-U shape between positive marital sorting (according to edu-
cation level) and some indicators for development. If one couples this with
Kutzet’s U, that suggests that inequality is largest for ’middle-layer’ devel-
opment countries, this translates to a statement that marital sorting is more
segregated when inequality is larger. The authors argue that when societies
become very developed, they also become quite complex, so people tend to
meet in all sorts of contexts, and in particular, parental control is reduced.
Even for the most developed countries there are considerable diﬀerences in
the degree of homogamy, in that high inequality countries as the US has more
homogamy than most countries in Europe (except some countries on the brim
of the Mediterranien), with egalitarian Norway standing out as having little
homogamy. There are, however, also cross-country diﬀerences that probably
should be ascribed to cultural diﬀerences.
We proceed as follows. In section 2 we describe the set of players, their
sets of actions, the timing of moves, and their payoﬀs. In section 3 we solve for
the equilibrium in the absence of matching institutions, consider the welfare
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properties and how redistributive taxation aﬀects welfare. In section 4 we
consider the role of institutions that improve matching along the two diﬀerent
dimensions by which individuals diﬀer in our framework. Section 5 discusses
uncertainty of the quality of a match at the point of possible marriage and
introduces a divorce option. Section 6 concludes.
2 The matching framework
We consider a set I = [0, 1] of individuals which is divided into two sets of
equal size, denoted as IM and IF .Individuals i ∈ I have two characteristics,
denoted by wi ∈ [0, w¯] and bi ∈ [0, b]. The first characteristic can be seen
as i’s wage rate in a perfectly competitive labor market. Together with an
endogenous labor supply decision zi ≥ 0 the labor market productivity will
determine gross labor income ziwi for individual i. The second characteristic
bi describes the individual’s preferences and emotional predispositions along
a one dimensional preference space.10 This characteristic will be important
for the non-monetary emotional benefits from marriage. The decision problem
whether or not to marry, and what this characteristic implies more precisely
if two individuals do marry, will be described later. In addition, there is
a welfarist government that may choose some institutional variables. The
individuals i ∈ I and the welfarist government are the players in a game with
four stages that is described as follows.
In Stage 1, the welfarist government chooses a linear income tax from
the set of proportional taxes with rates t ∈ [0, 1). It commits to redistributing
all tax revenue that may accrue on a per capita basis equally to all individ-
uals. The tax applies to all individuals, irrespective of their marital status.11
We restrict the instruments of the government to just this one, even though
other instruments that aﬀect the marriage decision may exist. Three reasons
motivate this restriction. First, redistributional income taxation is in any case
in operation in all modern economies. We show that this institution may have
an additional benefit that has so far been overlooked. Second, redistributive
taxation is a fairly direct instrument, as it works directly on the source of
ineﬃciency in marriage decisions. Third, other instruments may be diﬃcult to
10One could, for instance, think of bi as being distributed on a unit circle to emphasize
that the characteristic b is not ordered in the sense of universally better or worse.
11Individual income taxation is the predominant rule in OECD countries. Only a few
countries apply household income taxation. In many countries, however, there are some
special provisions for whether individuals are married or not married, and we disregard
these provisions here.
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implement or ineﬀective due to observability problems, they may cause addi-
tional transaction costs, and may often be inferior to income redistribution.12
In Stage 2, each individual from IM is matched with one other individ-
ual from IF according to a matching mechanism that is common knowledge.
We typically denote pairs of matched individuals as (m, f). All individuals
i ∈ I learn their own labor market productivity wi and preference character-
istic bi and that of their matched partner.
In Stage 3, all pairs of matched individuals (m, f)make their decisions
about whether to agree to a marriage. If both m and f agree to marry, the
marriage takes place. If at least one of them does not agree to marry, both
stay single.13
In Stage 4 all individuals choose their labor supply, which is denoted
zi ≥ 0, earn labor gross market income wizi, pay taxes tiwizi and receive a
government transfer s. Labor supply has an opportunity cost. We assume
that the eﬀort cost of labor is a quadratic cost function, Ci(zi) = z2i /2.
A person who is single bears the opportunity cost of his or her labor
supply, receives her gross income, pays taxes and receives some governmental
transfer s. Accordingly, her net income is
xi = (1− ti)wizi + s. (1)
The labor and consumption choices are more complex for married cou-
ples, and a full analysis needs to describe the labor choices and the intra-family
distribution of consumption as a subgame. We do not formalize this subgame
explicitly. We replace the respective subgame that emerged from such an
analysis by an exogenous intra-family rule of labor supply and consumption
choices. The outcome of this rule is as follows. Partners choose zm and zf to
maximize joint surplus net of taxes,
(1− t)wmzm + (1− t)wfzf −
z2m
2
−
z2f
2
+ 2s. (2)
12For instance, a marriage subsidy will also be claimed by people who are then a couple
in a material sense if the true status of a marriage is not observable, or will induce people
to marry who, from a welfare point of view, really should not marry.
13The search and matching process considered here is very simple, as each player is
matched with one other player only once, and a player who does not marry the player
he or she is matched with stays single. We expect that this simplification that does not
allow repeated matching does not aﬀect our results qualitatively. In particular, this sim-
ple framework can be seen as the limiting case of standard search and matching models
in which the future is highly discounted. The decision framework here could be embedded
into a standard search and matching model as in Burdett and Coles (1999). In this case,
the reservation utilities of i of being singe forever are to be replaced by the equilibrium
continuation value of a person who is single and waits for the next match.
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We note that the outcome in (2) can be microfounded within an approach
that considers the family as a cooperative bargaining framework with non-
cooperative threat points.14 Perfectly egalitarian consumption inside the mar-
riage is clearly a benchmark, but some amount of redistribution inside a mar-
riage is suﬃcient to reproduce our results qualitatively in a more generalized
context, and such redistribution has been found in a number of studies on
non-cooperative families or on cooperative families with non-cooperation as
the threat point of cooperative bargaining.15 Net of tax income (1− t)wmzm+
(1− t)wfzf is shared equally between m and f , such that consumption is
xm = xf = (1− t)
wmzm + wfzf
2
+ s, (3)
and each individual i bears his or her own cost of labor eﬀort Ci(zi) = z2i /2.
As can be seen from (3), the amount of intra-family income redistrib-
ution is considerable here. It is important to emphasize that any alternative
assumption that has considerably less, but some income redistribution inside
the family will generate qualitatively similar outcomes, as the same, but pos-
sibly smaller externality is at work when individuals make their decisions.
Turn now to the players’ objective functions. We assume that a player
m who is matched with player f has a payoﬀ
um = xm − Cm(zm) + Φmβmf . (4)
Here, Φm is an indicator function that takes on value Φm = 1 if m is married
to player f , and Φm = 0 if f is single, and βmf is the emotional benefit that
each partner obtains in the marriage. The size of this benefit depends on bm
and bf . The utility of individuals f ∈ IF that are matched with m ∈ IM is
defined analogously. We denote the emotional benefit from marrying that each
member of the match (m, f) has as a function
βmf = β(bm, bf). (5)
Its value can be positive or negative and is maximal and equal to some β∗ >
0 if bm = bf , and typically diminishes as a function of the ‘emotional and
14The most simple framework that yields this outcome has all consumption inside the
marriage a pure public good, with cost of producing each unit of this public consumption
good being two times the unit cost of consumption goods for single households, and eﬃcient
bargaining inside the marriage that causes eﬃcient labor choices (see the Appendix for
details).
15See, for instance, Konrad and Lommerud (1995, 2000) Lundberg and Pollak (1993,
2003) and Konrad, Künemund, Lommerud and Robledo (2002).
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preference distance’ |bm − bf | between m and f . However, we need not specify
the function β more precisely, but consider distributions H(β) of βmf directly,
with support [β, β∗].16
We assume that the emotional benefit is symmetric (βmf = βfm). This
is not necessarily the case. We also considered the case in which βmf =
β(bf), and βfm ≡ 0. In this case, the marriage is a contract in which one
side may buy ’love’ from the other side, and this also has interesting features
and implications for the desirability of redistributive taxation. Yet another
alternative assumption would be that the second characteristic, and the family
members’ benefits from it, are related to non financial qualities of the potential
partner which are sorted along a cardinal or ordinal scale (e.g., Anderberg
2004). Educational background or genetic fitness could be such qualities, and
perhaps even beauty, which some people try to measure on a scale from 1 to 10.
We consider preference complementarities on qualities which do not have such
a universally agreed ordinal property. If b were simply a universally agreed,
ordered qualities, these would essentially introduce a second quality dimension,
much like productivity w, and one partner with high earnings ability may
simply ‘buy’ a partner with high qualities along these other dimensions. Here
we assume that the emotional rent from marriage is not related to such an
ordinal quality dimension. One person is not universally superior to another
person along this second dimension. Instead, the emotional rent accrues from
a ’good match’ in terms of similarity or preference congruence, for instance
in terms of sharing the same sense of humour, similar preferences for food,
for climate, for travelling, for the type of holiday, and other jointly consumed
goods, or emotions that are diﬃcult to trace or to specify much further, such
as love and sympathy.
Utility in (4) is linear in consumption17. The cost of labor eﬀort enters
negatively, and the emotional rent from marriage enters additively, provided
that i is married. Finally, the government’s objective function is the aggregate
16Happiness studies suggest that, on average, the emotional rents from marriage are quite
high among married couples. Clark and Oswald (2002) estimate the average rent to be GBP
70 000 per annum. The estimate by Blanchflower and Oswald (2004) is USD 100 000 per
annum. This is for all still existing marriages, so rents from a good match should be even
larger.
17We make the assumption of linear utility of consumption utility not only for simplicity,
but also because we want to isolate the additional motivation for redistributive income
taxation analysed in this paper from other motivations that have been discussed elsewhere.
In particular, this assumption removes the classical Mirrlees (1971) motive for redistributive
taxation from the picture that a welfarist government may otherwise have.
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welfare of the set of individuals, which is defined as
Ω(t) =
Z
i∈I
uidi. (6)
Note that, given that individuals do not yet know their own labor market
productivities and preference characteristics at stage 1 and if these are drawn
from the same distribution for them, invoking the usual ’veil of ignorance’
argument, (6) can also be interpreted as the expected utility of individual i at
stage 1, turning the choice of the optimal tax rate into an eﬃciency problem.
3 Equilibrium and welfare
Consider Stage 4. Individuals i are either single or married to another indi-
vidual.
A single person A single person has the payoﬀ ui = (1− t)wizi+ s− z2i /2.
The optimal eﬀort choice determined from the first-order condition is (1 −
t)wi = zi. Inserting this eﬀort into the utility equation and simplifying yields
ui =
(1− t)2w2i
2
+ s. (7)
Inside the married family According to the description of intra-family
production and distribution, the spouses maximize (2). This yields eﬃcient
choices of eﬀort zm = (1 − t)wm and zf = (1 − t)wf . As the family income
is shared, this yields identical incomes ym = yf = (1 − t)2(w2m + w2f)/2 + s
for both partners. Moreover, i = m, f bear their own costs of eﬀort equal to
(1 − t)2w2i /2, respectively.18 As described in (4), the partners in a marriage
also enjoy some (possibly negative) rent from being together, that depends on
bm and bf in the way described by (5).
For given (wm, wf , bm, bf) we now can state the equilibrium intra-family
utility of m and f , which consists of their respective income shares after taxes
18This, plus the absence of scale economies from teaming up in a family simplify much
of the analysis. Together these assumptions make the eﬃcient labor choices independent
of marital status, and this also makes the government budget independent of marital sta-
tus. This helps to isolate the eﬀect of taxation and matching institutions. Alternative
assumptions about the family yield qualitatively similar results as regards the desirability of
redistributive taxation, but additional eﬀects blur the picture. For instance, scale economies
of consumption inside the family or non-cooperative labor choices inside the family are in-
teresting modifications that could be considered.
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and redistributions, minus their own cost of labor eﬀort, plus their own emo-
tional rent from this marriage. After consolidation of some terms, this utility
becomes
um = (1− t)2
w2f
2
+ s+ βmf and uf = (1− t)2
w2m
2
+ s+ βmf . (8)
Note that m’s payoﬀ is a function of f ’s labor market productivity and vice
versa. This is due to the eﬀect that both partners choose their workload
eﬃciently, bear their own cost of this workload, but share their total monetary
income. If, for instance, wf < wm, then m will end up being worse oﬀ than f
if they are married to each other.19
The government’s budget All individuals work eﬃciently in the equilib-
rium of the subgame in stage 4. As tax revenue is redistributed in a lump-sum
fashion, we have
s = t(1− t)
Z
i∈I
w2i di = t(1− t)E(w2i ). (9)
The assumptions about eﬃcient eﬀort choices inside the family make the value
of s independent of whether individuals marry or not here, which simplifies
the analysis.
Marriage choices Consider Stage 3. When individuals decide whether to
agree to a marriage with their randomly matched partner, they compare the
equilibrium utility they receive from Stage 4 if they stay single with their
equilibrium utility from marrying. Both persons need to agree to a marriage.
A comparison reveals that (8) is at least as high as (7), and, hence, both m
and f weakly prefer to marry if, and only if,
β(bm, bf) ≥ (1− t)2
¯¯
w2m − w2f
¯¯
2
. (10)
Intuitively, as both individuals have the same emotional benefit from
marriage and both individuals choose an eﬃcient amount of labor but share
19For our main result it is not essential that the more productive person ends up being
worse oﬀ than the less productive person. It is suﬃcient that there is some redistribution
between male and female inside the family. However, the feature in (8) is quite typical for
situations with incomplete contracts, with private provision to a public good playing an
important role.
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their net-of-tax incomes inside a marriage and not outside a marriage, the
more productive individual has the strictly lower benefit from marriage.
Note that
¯¯
w2m − w2f
¯¯
, and not the individual values wm and wf de-
termine whether a marriage takes place. We therefore simplify notation by
defining
ωmf ≡
¯¯
w2m − w2f
¯¯
. (11)
The distribution of male and female wages and the matching process between
them together imply a distribution of wage diﬀerences ωmf , and we denote by
G(ω) the cumulative distribution function of ωmf with support [ω, ω¯]. Condi-
tion (10) and (11) directly yield the following result:
Proposition 1 For any ωmf , there is a critical
βˆ(ωmf) =
ωmf (1− t)2
2
. (12)
such that a marriage takes place if βmf ≥ βˆ(ωmf ). This βˆ(ωmf ) is increasing
in ωmf , non-increasing in t ∈ (0, 1) and strictly decreasing in t ∈ (0, 1) if
ωmf 6= 0.
For given distributions H(β) of βmf and G(ω) of ωmf , an increase in
the tax rate will generally increase the range of possible matches for which
marriage takes place. Intuitively, the more productive person in a match is
decisive for whether a marriage takes place. The redistributional sacrifice
which the more productive person has from entering into a marriage with a
less productive person is smaller the higher the redistributive tax rate, and
this makes it more likely that the emotional benefit from marrying is higher
than the sacrifice from intra-family redistribution.
Before turning to solving the game, in what follows we make two rea-
sonable assumptions about the support [β, β∗] of the distribution of β that
simplify notation. The first assumption is that β ≤ 0. This assumption sug-
gests that marriage between some people can generate a negative emotional
surplus. This seems very plausible. Second, we assume that the maximum pos-
sible emotional benefit from marriage is very high. More precisely, we assume
that
β∗ >
ω¯
2
. (13)
From Proposition 1 it follows that this assumption will be suﬃcient for what
could be called the possibility of Cinderella marriages: the maximum possible
emotional benefit frommarriage is so high that, if two persons obtain this high-
est possible emotional benefit from marrying, they always marry, regardless
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of the income disparity between them. Cinderella outcomes may be rare, but
even the most extreme redistributional implications of marriage sometimes do
not prevent it from happening. Note that both assumptions are for notational
convenience only, unless the distributions G(ω) andH(β) are further specified:
if Cinderella outcomes were to be ruled out or if negative emotional benefits
were to be ruled out for the feasible set of matches, instead of imposing such
restrictions on the support of β, the probability mass on such outcomes can
be arbitrarily close to zero.
We turn to stage 1 and ask what is the optimal tax from the perspec-
tive of a benevolent government which knows the distributions of wi, ω and β
and maximizes (the expectation of) the welfare function (6). Making use of
the equilibrium behavior in the subgame in stages 2-4, if G(ω) and H(β) are
absolutely continuous, this objective function can be written as
Ω(t) =
Z
i∈I
(1− t)2w2i
2
di+
Z
i∈I
t(1− t)w2i di (14)
+2
Z
i∈IM
Z ω¯
0
G0(ω)
Z β∗
βˆ(ω)
βH 0(β)dβdωdi
=
1− t2
2
Ew2i +
Z ω¯
0
G0(ω)
Z β∗
ω(1−t)2
2
βH 0(β)dβdω
All incomes net of taxes and all eﬀort cost in the equilibrium can simply be
added, and this yields the first integral term in the first line of (14). The
second integral describes the expected tax revenue that is redistributed to the
individuals, which is also independent of the actual distribution of incomes
and matches. The third integral describes the expected emotional rents that
accrue from marriage decisions. In any matched pair (m, f), the emotional
rents βmf = βfm are the same for both individuals. Therefore, it is suﬃcient
to sum up the expected emotional rents for all individuals in IM , and to
multiply them by 2. Integrating the expected emotional rents for all individuals
m ∈ IM takes into consideration that the emotional rent that accrues to an
individual depends on whether the individual will end up in a marriage, and
from the size of the emotional rent given that the individual ends up being
married. We also use the assumption (13) which implies thatmin{β, ω(1−t)2
2
} =
ω(1−t)2
2
, simplifying this expression. The second equation in (14) uses that the
aggregate expected utility is equal to the expected utility of a randomly chosen
individual i ∈ I by the fact that I = [0, 1] has unit measure.
We note:
The introduction of a small income tax is (weakly) welfare enhancing.
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Proof. The result follows from
∂Ω
∂t |t=0
= 0 +
Z ω¯
0
ω2
2
G0(ω)H 0(
ω
2
)dω ≥ 0. (15)
Intuitively, the introduction of a small tax causes a tax distortion in the
labor market, but starting from t = 0, this distortion is of a magnitude that is a
second-order one. However, the tax will induce all pairs of individuals to marry
who had just been indiﬀerent, given t = 0. This typically is a first-order eﬀect.
Note that the same reasoning applies if the intra-family redistribution follows
a diﬀerent pattern: as long as marriage of individuals with diﬀerent economic
background will induce some income redistribution between these individuals
that cannot be fully controlled by marriage contracts, this redistribution may
prevent marriages that, seen from a welfare perspective, should take place.
As Ω0(0) ≥ 0, if Ω(t) is a concave function in t , the optimal value of
the tax rate is obtained by solving the first-order condition ∂Ω(t)∂t = 0, or
tEw2i =
Z ω¯
0
G0(ω)
ω(1− t)2
2
H 0(
ω(1− t)2
2
)ω(1− t)dω. (16)
As the right-hand side of (16) is non-negative and generically positive and
Ew2i > 0, the tax that is determined by this is non-negative and generically
positive. We state this result as
Proposition 2 If Ω(t) is concave, the optimal linear tax is determined by
(16).
The optimal linear tax is determined by the trade oﬀ between the in-
crease in the loss from distortionary taxation of labor eﬀort and the increase
in expected emotional rent that is obtained from relaxing the incentive con-
straints (10) that need to be fulfilled for making a marriage individually ra-
tional from the perspective of the more productive individual in each match.
Proposition 3 reveals a new motivation for optimal redistributive in-
come taxation: income redistribution and increased income equality is an in-
evitable consequence of marriage of individuals with diﬀerent earning abilities.
This property of marriage prevents some matched individuals from marrying,
even though, from an eﬃciency point of view, they should marry. Redistrib-
utive taxation equalizes incomes independently of whether individuals marry,
and this reduces the income equalizing eﬀect of marriage. This increases the
range of income diﬀerences along which marriage takes place.
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The motivation for redistributive taxation found here is independent
from other welfarist motivations characterized earlier on that have been dis-
cussed in the introduction. In particular, risk aversion, insurance or the equal-
ization of unequal marginal utilities of income as in the framework of optimal
income taxation does not play a role here, as the individuals considered here
are risk neutral.
In order to have a suitable criterion for comparing diﬀerent matching
regimes as regards the quality of matches they generate, and to do comparative
static analysis along only one dimension, we will sometimes focus on the case in
which the distributionsG(ω) andH(β) are uniformly distributed with densities
G0 = γ and H 0 = φ on their respective supports, [0, (1/γ)] and [β∗−(1/φ), β∗].
The assumption β ≤ 0 implies that β∗ − (1/φ) ≤ 0 , and (13) implies that
β∗ > 1/(2γ) in this case.
The parametric case with uniform density is also suitable for showing
that the assumptions for which the first-order condition Ω0(t) = 0 determines
the optimal tax are fulfilled for reasonable distributions. Inserting the uniform
density into the welfare function (14), we obtain
Ω(t) =
1− t2
2
Ew2i + γφ
Z (1/γ)
0
Z β∗
ω(1−t)2
2
βdβdω. (17)
The density H 0(β) ≡ φ can be factored out here due to the assumptions about
the supports of β and ω that make sure that ω(1−t)
2
2
> 0 ≥ β∗ − 1φ and that
ω(1−t)2
2
< β∗ for all ω. From (17) we obtain
Ω(t) =
1− t2
2
Ew2i +
1
2
φ
∙
(β∗)2 − (1− t)
4
12γ2
¸
. (18)
Note that Ω0(t) = −tEw2i + φ2
4(1−t)3
12γ2 . Hence, Ω
0(0) > 0 and Ω00(t) = −Ew2i −
φ
2
(1−t)2
γ2 < 0. Hence, the conditions as in Proposition 3 apply for this case,
and the first-order condition determines the optimal tax, which is the implicit
solution to
t
(1− t)3Ew
2
i =
φ
6γ2
. (19)
This condition can be used for the comparative statics when we consider and
compare institutions that lead to diﬀerent matching regimes.
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4 Matching institutions
So far we have assumed that the formation of pairs (m, f) follows some exoge-
nous matching process and that neither the government nor the individuals
influence this process. However, the distributions G(ω) and H(β) need not be
exogenously given. Indeed, institutions exist that influence or determine G(ω)
and H(β).
Some institutions have a stronger impact on H(β) than on G(ω). Free
secondary and tertiary education, for example, will typically be used by almost
all income groups, but each type of education will typically cluster individuals
with specific preferences bm ≈ bf . Similarly, there could be other institutions
that sort individuals along their labor market productivities and yield matches
with wm ≈ wf . We will consider the implications of the diﬀerent types of
matching institutions for welfare and for the role of redistributive taxation
that remains, given such institutions.
To allow for simple comparative static comparisons between matching
institutions, we consider the case with G(ω) andH(β) as uniform distributions
with supports [0, (1/γ)] and [β∗ − (1/φ), β∗], respectively.
Preference matching institutions First we consider the implications of
matching institutions that improve the matching of individuals as regards their
preference congruence.
Proposition 3 An increase in φ (improved preference matching) implies a
higher optimal tax rate.
Proof. Consider condition (19). The right hand side of (19) is monotonically
increasing in φ and the left hand side is monotonically increasing in t. Accord-
ingly, a higher φ implies that a higher optimal t is required to equalize the two
sides of equation (19).
Intuitively, the condition that determines the optimal t balances the
marginal welfare cost from labor market distortions from an increase in t and
the marginal benefits from more eﬃcient marriage decisions. A change in
φ does not change the marginal welfare cost that t has on the labor market.
However, the number of additional marriages induced by a marginal increase in
t is higher the higher the density of individuals who are marginally indiﬀerent
about whether or not to marry, and this density is monotonically increasing in
φ. Hence, the tax is more eﬀective at the margin in making individuals marry
if the love premium of marriage is less dispersed. Accordingly, if H 0(β) = φ
increases, then a given increase in taxes induces a larger share of matched
people to marry.
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Proposition 4 also describes the implications of the formation of insti-
tutions that improve the preference matching in the matching process. Such
institutions have a tendency to make a higher redistributional tax rate optimal.
For a given income heterogeneity that results from the matching mechanism,
better preference matching may induce a higher redistributive tax rate.
Productivity matching institutions Next we consider institutions that
improve the matching of individuals along the labor market productivity di-
mension. Let the actual distribution of productivities wi remain unchanged,
such that Ew2i remains unchanged. Consider a change in the matching insti-
tutions, such that G(ω) changes. In particular, consider a change in matching
institutions that reduces the dispersion of productivities of matched individu-
als.
Proposition 4 An increase in γ (improved income matching) decreases the
optimal redistributive tax.
Proof. Consider (19). The right-hand side of this expression is decreasing in γ
and independent of t. The left-hand side of (19) is increasing in t. Accordingly,
an increase in γ implies a decrease in t.
Intuitively, a higher γ means that productivities of matched individuals
are already more compressed. This makes further compression by an increase
in the redistributive tax rate less eﬀective.
The choice of matching institutions Propositions 4 and 5 suggest that
there is some complementarity between redistributive taxation and institutions
that improve preference matching and some substitutability between redistrib-
utive taxation and institutions that improve income matching. An important
example is tracking in the education system. Such systems also sort individ-
uals into diﬀerent types of school as a function of their performance/ability
measures when the tracking occurs. If there is a correlation between their
relative performance/ability measures at this point and their later relative
performance/ability, then tracking generates groups that are more homoge-
nous in their productivities. If matching is more likely for individuals inside
such groups than across groups, a tracking system can be a means that may
make redistributive taxation less important as a means for overcoming the
ineﬃciency in marriage decisions.20
20Via its impact on individual productivities, tracking may also change the aggregate dis-
tribution of abilities/performance in the working population and may increase its dispersion.
For the sake of the argument, we disregard this possibility here.
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Note, however, that the redistributional consequences of income match-
ing institutions and of redistributive income taxation are very diﬀerent. The
institutions that improve matching along the income dimension will make
matches likely in which m and f both have high income or both have low
income. As discussed in the empirical analysis by Ermisch, Francesconi and
Siedler (2006), this reduces intergenerational income mobility and social strat-
ification. In contrast, redistributive taxation will generally reduce the income
dispersion in the aggregate across individuals, and will increase the likelihood
of intermarriage between social and income classes. This makes productiv-
ity matching institutions particularly attractive for highly productive persons.
They improve the quality of the match, they reduce the optimal redistribu-
tive tax. Broadening the perspective beyond the narrow limits of our formal
framework, income matching institutions may also have an impact on the inter-
generational transmission of the income distribution: such institutions make
it more likely that the rich marry the rich and the poor marry the poor, and,
in addition, reduce the amount of optimal redistributive taxation. Accord-
ingly, income matching institutions reduce the importance of intermarriage
as a source of intergenerational income mobility, and this eﬀect is reinforced
by the impact of such institutions for the optimal amount of redistributive
taxation.
One may also consider individuals’ incentives for making use of match-
ing institutions as a function of their earnings abilities and their specific
preferences. Individuals with very diﬀerent incomes may consider marrying
if their emotional premium from preference complementarities is suﬃciently
high. This result is robust to more general settings in which individuals who do
not marry in a particular match are matched with other partners in the future,
provided that the next match occurs only after a considerable amount of time,
or if the intertemporal discount rate is high. The willingness of individuals
with diﬀerent incomes to marry benefits low income earners more than high in-
come earners. Accordingly, individuals with high income earning abilities may
prefer to use institutions that improve matching along the earning abilities di-
mension, whereas individuals with low income earning abilities may prefer to
use institutions that improve matching along the emotional/preference match-
ing dimension. This self selection into matching institutions as a function of
own earnings abilities itself works as a matching device and if we observe
more income heterogeneity in clubs or associations which cater to very specific
preferences, could explain why we may observe fewer preference unspecific as-
sociations or clubs for low income groups, and why we may observe unspecific
associations with very high membership fees.
Such self-selection into matching institutions also has some impact as
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regards the distribution of emotional rents in a society. If individuals with
high earning abilities predominantly use matching institutions that sort along
earning ability, they have a tendency for marrying even if the emotional rent
from marriage is small. Individuals with low earning abilities may predom-
inantly use matching institutions that sort along the preference congruence
dimension, and this implies that they are more likely to have high emotional
rents when they marry.
5 Love uncertainty and the divorce option
So far we have assumed that the marriage decision is irreversible. In such a
context, when individuals decide whether or not to marry what matters for
the decisions of individuals in a given match are the expectations of β and ω.
Whether β and ω are deterministic and fully known at the point of marriage
or whether they are random variables with known distributions is not crucial
for their marriage decision: individuals ask whether their expected emotional
rent from marriage plus the implications of intra-marriage redistribution adds
up to something positive.
More recently, work by Anderberg (2001), Rasul (2005), Brien, Lillard
and Stern (2006) and Chiappori and Weiss (2006) and others consider the role
of divorce for marriage decisions, particularly in matching frameworks. They
highlight the fact that the quality of a match may be revealed only over time
or may change during the marriage. Taking into account that individuals can
divorce, the incoming information about the quality of a match becomes im-
portant and changes the decision problem in our framework also. Essentially,
marriage in a situation in which the actual quality of the match is still uncer-
tain gives the individuals who marry an option value. If the marriage turns
out to imply a high emotional rent, they continue to stay together. If not, the
more productive person who suﬀers from the intra-marital income distribution
may desire a divorce, provided that the transaction cost of divorce is not too
high, and assuming that divorce can be forced by a unilateral decision.
Chiappori and Weiss (2006) focus on the beneficial eﬀects of higher
divorce rates that work via their beneficial eﬀects regarding the matching
problem with respect to remarriage. We do not allow for rematching and
remarrying, but we consider how the option of divorcing at a given cost influ-
ences the decision trade-oﬀ of the more productive person who has to share
part of his/her income if he/she wants to enjoy the emotional rents from the
marriage.
To study the implications of a divorce option, we modify and expand the
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framework. First, at the point when two matched individuals have to decide
whether to marry, they know that their actual productivities wm, wf and
match specific quality βmf are random variables with cumulative distribution
functionsWm,Wf and Bmf . The actual values of wm, wf and βmf are revealed
right after the decision whether or not to marry. Second, at a new decision
stage 3a each individual can bring about a divorce by deciding to terminate
the marriage right after they have learned the actual values of wm, wf and
βmf . After a divorce, each of them will pursue their lives as singles and will
not have an opportunity to remarry.
The divorce also imposes some cost on each of them, and this divorce
cost is denoted as δ ≥ 0. A narrow interpretation of this cost is simply
the transaction cost of splitting up the family, dividing the household, or the
additional transaction cost in the context of child raising. Alimony is, in
principle, a diﬀerent issue, but the results we have are also indicative for the
role of alimony. Such payments are typically made by the high income earner
to the low earner, i.e., they are a cost of divorce for the high income earner
(but not for the low income earner). Now, in our decision framework the high
income earner is the one who decides both whether the marriage takes place or
whether to divorce. Whether or not the low income earner also has a divorce
cost is not important in this case.
Uncertain emotional rents We concentrate on the case in which labor
market productivity is deterministic at the stage when individuals are matched
and it is common knowledge, and where only the emotional rent βmf is a
non-degenerate random variable when players decide about whether to marry.
The consideration of uncertain labor market productivities is also interesting,
but more complex, as uncertainty about ωmf is typically not feasible without
uncertainty about wm and wf , and the relationship between the two will gen-
erally depend on the matching process that has been considered as a black box
here. To deal with uncertain labor market productivities will typically require
opening up this black box, and we defer this to future research.
Note that the decision making of stage 4 remains the same as in
section 3, given that an individual is single or married. However, if individuals
reach this stage after divorcing, their payoﬀ is reduced by the divorce cost δ,
compared to reaching this stage as a person who has never married. Turn
now to stage 3a, between stage 3 and stage 4. If an individual m or f is
single at this stage, the individual has nothing to decide. Suppose, instead, an
individual m is married to another individual f , and let wm ≥ wf . Whether
they stay married or choose to divorce depends on a condition that is similar
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to (12). They continue as a married couple if
βmf + δ ≥ (1− t)2
¯¯
w2m − w2f
¯¯
2
= (1− t)2ωmf
2
. (20)
Divorce occurs otherwise.
Turn now to the stage 3 at which m and f are matched and decide
about whether to marry. The payoﬀ of m from not marrying is given in (7).
The expected payoﬀ for m from marrying is
Bmf ((1− t)2
ωmf
2
− δ)
∙
(1− t)2w2m
2
− δ
¸
(21)
+(1−Bmf ((1− t)2
ωmf
2
− δ))
(1− t)2w2f
2
+
Z β∗
(1−t)2 ωmf
2
−δ
βB0mf(β)dβ + s.
Accordingly, the expected net benefit of marrying for playerm can be denoted
as the diﬀerence between (21) and (7), which reduces to
(1−Bmf (βˆ))(w2f − w2m)
(1− t)2
2
− δBmf (βˆ) +
Z β∗
βˆ
βB0mf (β)dβ, (22)
with βˆ(t, ωmf , δ) = (1− t)2 ωmf2 − δ. The first term in (22) is non-negative for
player f and non-positive for m, and this second player is decisive for whether
the marriage takes place, and whether the marriage is sustained or the couple
are divorced.
The analysis for player f is fully analogous and the expected benefit
for f is obtained by replacing m and f in (22).
If δ is very high, divorce is prohibitively expensive. The problem be-
comes equivalent to the problem in sections 2 and 3 without divorce, with
Eβmf =
Z β∗
β
βB0mf (β)dβ (23)
replacing the deterministic βmf in the analysis in sections 2 and 3.
If δ is zero, then the marriage will always take place. The situation is
also equivalent to the problem in sections 2 and 3, where stage 3a is trivial
(always marry) and the divorce stage plays the role of the marriage decision in
section 3, and is based on the same decision criterion as in section 2, where the
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continuation of marriage here is equivalent to the decision to marry in sections
2 and 3, and where this decision is based on the ex post realized value of βmf .
Suppose the divorce cost δ is positive, but not prohibitively high. In this
case, the more productive person trades oﬀ the option value of marrying with
the expected income sacrifice from marrying. An increase in δ will typically
make marriage less likely, but more stable. The more productive individual is
decisive. This individual’s benefits from marrying and his/her utility in the
state of marriage both weakly decrease in δ. Assuming that β ≤ −δ, this can
be seen from diﬀerentiating (22) with respect to δ, as this yields
B0mf (βˆ)(w
2
f−w2m)
(1− t)2
2
+βˆB0mf (βˆ)−Bmf (βˆ)+δB0mf (βˆ) =if wf<wm −Bmf (βˆ) ≤ 0 .
(24)
We summarize this as a proposition:
Proposition 5 An increase in the cost of divorce (weakly) decreases the more
productive partner’s expected benefit from marriage.
The welfare implications of divorce cost are indeterminate. To see this,
we consider a simple example that reveals that divorce cost may increase or
decrease welfare. Consider ωmf = 4, t = 0, and βmf ∈ {1, 10} with probability
1 − p and p, respectively, and compare the cases with divorce cost equal to
δ = 1.1 and δ = 0.
For δ = 0, marriage takes place; a divorce occurs if, and only if, βmf =
1. Accordingly, the expected emotional rents sum up to 2× 10p.
For δ = 1.1, consider first the divorce behavior once βmf is known.
If m and f did not marry, the expected emotional rents sum up to zero. If
m and f married, then the marriage continues if βmf + δ ≥
ωmf
2
. Given the
parameters in the example, the marriage is always sustained, even if βmf = 1,
as βmf + δ = 2.1 > 2 = ωmf/2. The expected emotional rents sum up to
2× (10p + (1− p)). Hence in this example the divorce cost increases welfare
if the marriage takes place, and it decreases welfare compared to δ = 0 if the
marriage does not take place. Note that m agrees to marry f if the ex ante
benefit from marrying is positive, i.e., if the expected emotional rent exceeds
the distributional cost, which is the case if p·10+(1−p)·1 ≥ 2. Otherwise player
m does not want to marry f . The same applies for f ’s decision. Compared
to δ = 0, a divorce cost of δ = 1.1 increases ex ante welfare if p ≥ 1/9, and
decreases ex ante welfare if p < 1/9.
Consider now the implications of redistributive taxation for the decision
to divorce, and for the decision to marry. Let m be the decisive player in a
given match (m, f). Suppose first that m with wm > wf preferred to marry
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f . Then, the increased stability of this marriage is straightforward from the
definition of the critical level of emotional rent βˆ(t, ωmf , δ) = (1− t)2 ωmf2 − δ,
at which m is indiﬀerent whether to continue or to terminate the relationship.
An increase in t decreases the critical βˆ for which m is just indiﬀerent between
divorce or not; hence, an increase in t stabilizes a marriage for given wm and
wf with respect to the uncertainty of emotional rents from marrying. The
same logic applies if f is the decisive player.
Moreover, an increase in t makes marriage more likely from an ex ante
point of view. The net benefit of marriage that is obtained from a marginal
increase in t can be derived from (22) as
(1−Bmf(βˆ))(w2f − w2m)(1− t) (25)
+
∙
−B0mf(βˆ)(w2f − w2m)
(1− t)2
2
− δB0mf (βˆ)− βˆB0mf (βˆ)
¸
∂βˆ
∂t
. (26)
Making use of βˆmf = (1− t)2
ωmf
2
− δ, the square bracket reduces to zero, such
that the whole expression reduces to
−(1−Bmf (βˆ))(w2f − w2m)(1− t), (27)
and this expression is positive given that wf < wm. We summarize this as
Proposition 6 Let wm > wf . For given divorce cost δ > 0, an increase
in t increases m’s expected net benefit from a marriage and makes any given
marriage more stable.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we uncover a new, and potentially important, eﬃciency reason
for income redistribution: redistribution encourages people to marry if they
are a good match in terms of their preferences and emotions but diﬀer in their
income earning abilities. Marriage involves some intra-family redistribution,
particularly if the people who marry are very unequal in their income earning
abilities or wealth. This may prevent people with diﬀerent income from marry-
ing, even if their emotional benefits frommarrying were large, because the high
income earner is concerned too much about sharing his or her income with the
respective partner. From a social point of view, and from an ex ante eﬃciency
point of view when individuals do not yet know their later productivities in
life, only the emotional rent should count for whether a marriage should take
place, whereas the income redistribution is essentially neutral from a welfare
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point of view (or may be even beneficial from such a point of view). Taxation
reduces the inequality and this makes the emotional rent from marrying more
important for the private decisions about whether to marry, and this improves
the eﬃciency properties of marriage decisions.
We also consider how matching institutions aﬀect the size of the opti-
mal redistributive income tax. We find that matching institutions that make it
more likely that individuals who are a good match in terms of their emotional
and preference disposition are matched suggest an even higher optimal redis-
tributive tax. Such institutions are complementary to redistributive taxation
as a means of improving marriage decisions. In contrast, matching institutions
that make it more likely that individuals with similar incomes are matched are
substitutes for redistributive taxation. In existing societies both matching in-
stitutions and voters’ preference for redistribution evolve over the long run. It
is hard to say what governs these processes and what comes first and last. Our
analysis indicates that very diﬀerent societal situations can be optimal at the
same time. In some societies, matching will typically be along the dimension
of income. Redistribution is than less needed than with preference matching.
Or, the other way around, with little redistribution there is much need for
income matching institutions — for the sake of love. At the same time, other
societies can have settled in a quite diﬀerent equilibrium with much preference
matching and much redistribution. As we have mentioned before, Clark and
Oswald (2002) and Blanchflower and Oswald (2004) suggest that the avarage
rent from an existing marriage is high and roughly the same in the US and
the UK — even though matching institutions and the level of redistribution
are likely to be diﬀerent in the two countries. Nevertheless, given matching
institutions, redistribution is good for love, but more so in societies with what
we have called preference matching.
Finally we discuss the role of divorce in the present framework. Mar-
riage is more likely if the cost of divorce is lower, but divorce rates will also
be higher. The welfare implications of the cost of a divorce are not straight-
forward. Redistributive taxation has similar eﬀects in a framework with a
divorce option. It stabilizes marriage and makes marriage for a given match
more likely.
We develop these results in a very basic matching framework and make
some stylized assumptions about the way a marriage is organized. We expect
that our results generalize qualitatively for more general frameworks.
25
7 Appendix
We used a reduced form for describing the optimization problem within the
family and assumed that the partners maximize joint surplus described by (2)
that can be based on several microeconomic underpinnings. As an example,
we sketch a possible microfoundation for the setup used in (2) in an infinitely
repeated game as follows.
Consider the period game. Let the individual utility functions of single
individuals be again be given by
ui = (1− t)wizi + s−
zi2
2
. (28)
Single individuals then solve their maximization problem by z∗i = (1−t)wi, and
pay taxes equal to Ti = t(1 − t)w2i . This is also the outcome in each period
if we consider an infinitely repeated game with discounting, and for a time
invariant discount factor, the discounted present value of utility is obtained by
multiplying this utility with 1/(1− δ).
Consider now a married couple. Assume that all income inside the
family has to be used on non-exclusive, and non-rival public goods. This as-
sumption implicitly rules out monetary transfers and compensation payments
between spouses. Suppose further that each unit of these family public goods
costs two units of private goods, which sterilizes against possible economies or
diseconomies of scale. Accordingly, if zm and zf are the units of labor chosen
by the spouses, the consumption term in their utility becomes
xm = xf = (1− t)
wmzm + wfzf
2
+ s, (29)
and their tax payments are Tm+Tf = twmzm +twfzf , respectively. Individual
m’s utility, hence, is
um =
xm + xf
2
− zm
2
2
+ βmf . (30)
Suppose first that m and f choose their labor eﬀorts non-cooperatively.
Individual maximization taking zf and s as given, m equalizes own individual
marginal disutility of labor and own individual marginal consumption benefit
from this eﬀort; hence, m chooses
zˆm = (1− t)
wm
2
(31)
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and analogously for f . The resulting utilities from inserting zˆm and zˆf into
(30) yield the period payoﬀs in the non-cooperative equilibrium as
uˆm =
(1− t)2w2m
2
+ (1− t)2w
2
f
2
+ 2s
2
− (1− t)2w
2
m
8
+ βmf (32)
and analogously for uˆf .
Family utility in each period is maximized for a combination of zm
and zf that maximizes um + uf , and the respective values of work eﬀorts are
z∗m = (1 − t)wm and z∗f = (1 − t)wf . They co-incide with the work eﬀort
chosen by singles, because, by construction, the higher price of family goods
just compensates for the eﬀect of non-rivalry in consumption. The resulting
utilities are
u∗m =
(1− t)2w2m + (1− t)2w2f + 2s
2
− (1− t)2w
2
m
2
+ βmf , (33)
and analogously for f .
Whether this eﬃcient outcome can be reached inside the family and
without side payments in an infinitely repeated game with a Friedman equi-
librium (i.e., with Nash reversion punishment) depends on whether the utilities
reached for z∗m and z
∗
f are at least as high as uˆm and uˆf for both spouses and on
the size of the discount factor δ. Comparing the utility diﬀerence, u∗i − uˆi > 0
for both i = m, f , if
w2f
2
< w2m < 2w
2
f . (34)
As the individual gain from unilaterally deviating from the cooperative equi-
librium in one period is finite, it follows from straightforward reasoning that
the eﬃcient choices of labor input can be supported as a Friedman equilibrium
of an infinitely repeated game if the discount factor δ is suﬃciently close to 1.
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